We study cyber conflict as a two-person zero-sum game in discrete time, where each player discovers new exploits according to an independent random process. Upon discovery, the player must decide if and when to exercise a munition based on that exploit. The payoff from using the munition is a function of time that is (generally) increasing. These factors create a basic tension: the longer a player waits to exercise a munition, the greater his payoff because the munition is more mature, but also the greater the chance that the opponent will also discover the exploit and nullify the munition. Assuming perfect knowledge and under mild restrictions on the time-dependent payoff function for a munition, we derive optimal exercise strategies and quantify the value of engaging in cyber conflict. Our analysis also leads to high level insights on cyber conflict strategy.
Introduction
Conflict in Cyberspace, or cyber conflict, is important at both the strategic and tactical levels. In this paper we consider the strategic decisions made by states or other groups about when and how to engage in cyber conflict. The increasing dependency on interconnected networks both in military and civilian life means that little is beyond the reach of cyberspace. Cyberspace plays a central role in our social, economic, and civic welfare. It is, therefore, not surprising that the United States "has identified cyber security as one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face as a nation" (National Security Council, 2010) . Consequently, security and defense in cyberspace has become an increasingly large part of the defense budget (Stervstein, 2011) .
A defining characteristic of cyber conflict is the way in which weapons in cyberspace are discovered, developed and employed. Players search for mechanisms that can cause cyber systems to perform in ways not intended in their original design, called exploits, and, once found, develop them into one or more cyber munitions. These munitions can then be used as part of a cyber attack. In searching for exploits to use against an adversary, a player may also discover flaws in their own system and decide to patch them so an adversary cannot use them. Moreover, a player could develop munitions based on an exploit that the adversary independently fixes, thereby making the munitions obsolete. Thus, collections of cyber munitions, or arsenals, are dynamic and their effectiveness depends on the relative state of knowledge of the opponents.
In this context, apparently simple questions, such as "how long should we hold a munition in development before using it in an attack?" and "how should we allocate limited resources to offense versus defense?" require novel analytical models. Moreover, the dynamic nature of cyber weapons development and obsolescence makes it difficult to assess the potency of an arsenal; this is true for assessing our own arsenal as well as an arsenal belonging to an adversary. Clear, useful analysis at the national level is important both for making sound future investment decisions and for creating informed strategic and policy guidance.
To analyze the strategic decisions involved in cyber conflict, we use a game theoretic framework-we view cyber warfare as a game consisting of attacks that opposing players exercise at a time of their choosing. Each player discovers, develops, and chooses to exercise attacks to maximize the value of their cyber operations. Our analysis is independent of specific technologies, and does not assume an explicit cyber system or exploit.
Using minimal assumptions, our model leads to two fundamental insights:
 Success requires rapid action. Our model shows that delays in taking action reduce the chance of a player's success in cyber conflict. Such delays can come from a variety of sources, including bureaucratic or command restrictions. A byproduct of our model is the calculation of how proficient a player must be in other areas to make up for delays in taking action; in most cases the required capability is unattainable. The immediate consequence of this is that command structures in cyberspace should be agile with the correct level of delegation of authority.
 Prospects for deterrence in cyber conflict may be limited. The ability of players to deter their opponents from attacking depends on an assured second strike. In cyber conflict, opposing players may have munitions based on the same exploit, and the first player to use the exploit effectively removes second strike munitions from the opponent's arsenal. Complicating factors to the cyber conflict game, such as an inability to identify the player who performed a cyber attack, or a player's ability to respond with kinetic munitions, also have an effect on deterrence in cyber conflict.
Related work
The JASONS 2010 report, The Science of Cyber-Security (JASON, 2010), recommends a variety of analytic approaches and recommends borrowing ideas from other sciences, such as physics, cryptography, and biological sciences, including epidemiology. The JASONS introduce a two-player, stationary, discrete time model called the Forwarder's Dilemma as an example of what a gametheoretic analysis might look like. This game considers whether an administrator should forward another system's messages on their network and is similar both in format and solution to the wellknown Prisoner's Dilemma (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) . Lye and Wing (2002) and Shen (2007) also consider cyber attacks in the context of a game. The most comprehensive survey of game theory and cyberspace is by Shiva et al. (2010) . They develop a taxonomy of game theoretic models with two broad categories:
 Static vs. Dynamic. A 'one shot' cyber conflict game, where players choose plans of action and then execute them simultaneously, is a static game. A cyber conflict game with multiple stages and sequential decisions is a dynamic game.
 Available Information. Players may have exact, imperfect or no knowledge about their opponent's intentions or capabilities. If the players know the actions of other players once taken, this is called a game with perfect information. If the players know the structure of the game and payoffs, but not the actions, this is called a game with complete information. Finally, a game in which the payoffs evolve in time in a random process is a stochastic game.
While game theory considers both cooperative and non-cooperative games, work to date on cyber conflict deals only with non-cooperative games. In the taxonomy of Shiva et al. our proposed model is a non-cooperative, dynamic, stochastic game with perfect information.
The previous study which has the most commonality with our approach is that of Lye and Wing (2002) . They consider a two-player, stochastic game between an attacker and administrator. Their model is at the machine level; it focuses on an attacker attempting to find the best policy among a portfolio of several attacks to damage a university computer network. This game theoretic model of Lye and Wing maps to the tactical level of conflict as opposed to our model that is focused at the strategic level between two players engaged in cyber conflict.
Our work differs from previous work by abstracting cyber conflict away from individual machines and instruction sets in the same manner that Lanchester equations (Washburn and Kress, 2009 ) abstract physical conflict away from soldiers and weapons. The goal of this paper is to provide a foundation from which to build more complex models towards the ultimate goal of integrating the cyber domain into the spectrum of conflict analysis, to support strategic models for decision makers at the national level.
Analysis

Foundation
As defined previously, a computer system may contain exploits; these are unknown until discovered, after which they can be fixed in the form of a patch or weaponized into a munition. We model the lifecycle of a single cyber exploit as a four-stage process.
Discovery of the exploit
We model the discovery of a single exploit by each player as a random process, occurring independently for each player, which may depend on factors such as training, investment, experience and luck.
Development of munition
Once an exploit is discovered, a player can develop a munition based on the exploit. We assume that there is a relationship between the length of time that a player knows about an exploit and the effectiveness of the munition he develops based on that exploit. Munitions may only be developed for known exploits.
Employment
Once a munition is developed, it can be employed at will against an adversary in an attack.
Obsolescence
Consider a game between two players, Player 1 and Player 2. If Player 1 discovers an exploit in his system and patches it before Player 2 can develop a munition based on that exploit is employed, then that munition becomes obsolete.
Uncertainties about the obsolescence of a player's own arsenal are a key dimension in the analysis of cyber conflict. For the purposes of this analysis, we assume that a player who is aware of an exploit also knows whether the other player(s) are aware of the same exploit; this removes one type of uncertainty. For a player who is unaware of an exploit, we assume neither player knows the time until the unaware player discovers the exploit. This uncertainty in discovery times is the fundamental tension that our model seeks to explore.
We model cyber warfare as a Markov game (Thie, 1983; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) where the choices available to each player depend on the number of exploits known by each player and the strength of each player's munitions. In general, there may be multiple exploits that each player discovers, develops into munitions, and uses to attack, but we choose to focus our analysis on a scenario where there is only a single exploit to be discovered. At the beginning of this scenario, neither player knows the exploit. Each player probabilistically discovers the exploit, and when either player chooses to attack, then payoffs are determined and the game terminates.
Formulation
Our model focuses on a strategic cyber conflict between two players, where there is a single exploit to be discovered. Let i index the players {1, 2} i  . The mathematical notation used to describe the game falls into three broad categories: Discovery, Development, and Employment.
Discovery
Let T be the duration of time that an exploit has existed, which we also call the clock time. Without loss of generality, we assume that the game starts when the exploit is created. We create a discrete time model, with T increasing over the set of positive integers. If the exploit was part of the original system, then T is the age of the system. If the exploit was introduced as part of a software upgrade, then T is the age of the upgrade. , ,
where the elements of this three-tuple represent how long the exploit has existed, how long Player 1 has known the exploit, and how long Player 2 has known the exploit, respectively.
Development
A player's success in cyber conflict depends both on his ability to discover exploits and his ability to develop effective munitions. We assume that at any moment following the discovery i d , player i has the ability to create and deploy a perfectly effective patch. However, we assume that the act of deploying the patch effectively announces it to the adversary; so patching nullifies everyone's munitions based on that exploit, and this ends the game for both sides. Let   i p T denote the probability that player i discovers an exploit as clock time progresses from period T to period
a  be the value of an attack by player i using a munition developed using a holding time of i  . The value of an attack is a function of  instead of T because we assume that once the exploit is known the effectiveness of the munition depends on holding time and not clock time. We impose two constraints on
namely that if an exploit is not known, then an attack based on it has no value. Additionally, we
B is an arbitrary upper bound, thus disallowing cyber attacks with either a negative value or an infinite value.
Employment
Once a player has a cyber munition, he may choose to use it. Let
 W : Wait. While a player is waiting, he is either waiting to discover the exploit ( i 0) or he may know about the exploit ( i 0) and be working to make his munitions more effective.
 A :Attack. When a player attacks he receives the value of his attack at that time. Attacking also broadcasts the attack's underlying exploit to all players.
A player who does not know the exploit has a singleton action set,   W , and a player that does know the exploit has the full action set,   , W A .
Zero sum game with perfect information
To fully specify the game, we must define action sets for each player, and the utilities for player's actions. We assume a zero sum strategic conflict; i.e. that any utility gain by one player results in an equal utility loss by the opponent. We use the convention that Player 1 is a maximizing player and Player 2 is a minimizing player. We assume that each player knows the state of the Markov game, S. But this perfect information assumption does not mean that a player knows the exploit. A player is still limited by his action set. For example, if the state of the game is ,1, 0 T , it means that: Player 1 knows the exploit, has a holding time of 1, and has an action set of   , W A ; while, Player 2 does not know the exploit, has a holding time of 0, and therefore has an action set of solely   W .
Markov game transitions
The discovery and development of attacks is modeled as transitions in the state of the Markov game. The game begins in the state 0, 0, 0 and proceeds in discrete rounds. In each round, the clock time T increases deterministically. For each player i, the holding time  i  0 until the player discovers the exploit. Exploit discovery happens with probability   i p T for player i in round T . Once an exploit is discovered by a player, the player's holding time increases deterministically. The resulting transitions of the Markov game state are summarized in Table 1 . A visual depiction of the states of the game is presented in Figure 1 . 
Both players know the exploit
In this case, we have 1 2 0, 0     and both players have full action sets, meaning each may attack or wait. Table 2 represents the payoffs of the Markov game in such a state in matrix form. Each entry in the matrix contains a single real number, since the game is zero sum. If both players wait, the value is determined by future play. If one player attacks and the other waits, the attacking player receives the full value of his munition. If both players attack simultaneously, the sum of the munition values gives the result of the game. a  .
Only one player knows the exploit
For simplicity, we develop the theory from a state where Player 1 has the exploit and Player 2 does not. The analysis follows identical lines in the opposing situation. In this case, Player 1 has a full action set and Player 2 may only wait to discover the exploit,
. Suppose the state of the game is , ,0
to be the expected utility if both players choose to wait at time T. In particular, we have: 
This statement mirrors our intuition that a player should attack if only if an immediate attack results in a higher utility than waiting for any number of turns before attacking. 
, which implies that
( 1) ( ) ( ) (1)
where the last inequality came from the fact that 1 (·) a is concave and nondecreasing. Continuing with the last expression above, we have
where the last inequality came from the fact that 2 (·) p is nondecreasing and 2 (1) a is nonnegative.
Finally, multiplying both sides of the inequality by the positive number
We can complete the proof as follows:
(1) (0).
Each of the paired terms on the right hand side is smaller than zero, by equation (2), thus we have
For the remainder of this paper we assume stationary probabilities is not identically zero, meaning that Player 1 will eventually prefer to attack. We conclude that:
While we presume that most cases will have nondecreasing 1 2 1 2 , , , a a p p functions, there is no reason that it must be so. Nondecreasing functions model situations where the passage of time brings increased capability, both in development and detection. However, there may be interesting, and operationally relevant, cases where the functions are decreasing. Although we do not present detailed results here, the value functions in these alternate situations may evaluated directly by using equations (1) and (2).
Neither player has the exploit
In this case, the game has been in play for an unknown amount of time and 
1, )
where the negative sign comes from the fact that Player 1 is a maximizing player, and Player 2 is a minimizing player; and
k denote results of equations (3) and (4) (3) and (4) if Player 2 is the first to discover the exploit.
Numerical analysis
In this section, we consider some concrete examples of the theory developed in the previous section. Unless otherwise specified, we assume
As a notational convenience we will denote the value of any particular example as n V where n is the example number.
Scenario 1: Constant i a functions
Suppose that Players 1 and 2 both have attack value functions such that:
a  is concave and increasing for both players, we can use Theorem 2 to compute the optimal attack time for each player,
, which is 1 for both players. We may directly compute the value of the game using equation (5):
In particular, Player 1 will have a positive expected payoff if and only if:
In this case, a player may make up for a deficiency in either discovery or development by being strong in the other area. Because 0 1 i p   these tradeoffs are implicitly limited. Here we see that the value of the game is a concave function of Player 1's probability of detecting the exploit; increases in detection probability at low detection values provide a bigger increase in the game value than increases in detection probability at high detection values. .3 a p   , and Player 1's value function has a single dip, specifically 1 ( ) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 3, 6,) a   as shown in Figure 4 . In this case, we cannot use Theorem 2 to compute the optimal attack time. However, we may compute the optimal attack time directly, by computing the value of holding for each possible holding period, as depicted in Figure 5 . (7) a would change Player 1's decision? We answer this question by performing a line search on 1 (7) a and determine the threshold value is 6.6  .
Scenario 2: Linearly increasing
Extensions and applications
In this section, we explore the operationally relevant implications of our model.
Delayed action
It may be the case that a player discovers an exploit and cannot take action; specifically, he is unable (or not allowed) to attack, patch, or work towards development of a munition for some predetermined fixed time after discovery of an exploit. This may be due to legal, policy, or organizational limitations.
One player delayed action
Suppose Player 1 has a rule where he must wait w time periods after discovery before any attack, patch or development of a munition. Consistent with our previous definition of perfect information, if Player 2 has the exploit, he learns if Player 1 knows the exploit. Player 2 also knows the existence and duration of Player 1's delay rule.
We wish to understand the value of this delayed version of our game, which we denote as opponent. We see that Player 1's utility drops off rapidly from an expected value of zero, with the implication that waiting is costly.
We can also ask 'How good does Player 1's detection probability 1 p need to be in order to make up for a given waiting time w ?' Figure 2 shows the adjustment required in this example; for waiting times longer than 5 periods, even perfect detection does not achieve parity. 
Deterrence
In the preceding subsection, we advise belligerents in cyber conflict to develop and execute their attacks quickly-a stance that is incompatible with the notion of "crisis stability" (Kent, 1989) of classical deterrence theory. Can deterrence in cyber conflict be achieved, and if so, how? Several scholars ask this question, notably (Sterner, 2011) . In this paper we consider one aspect of cyber deterrence.
A short review of strike stability
The concept of strike stability was developed during the Cold War to understand which sets of circumstances would lead to nuclear conflict. The original papers describe the development and application of this theory to nuclear arms. Kent (1989) describes a game which has many similarities with the one described herein; two players are faced with the decision of 'attacking' or 'not attacking'; they make this decision by weighing the benefits of going 'first' or 'second' with the assumption that the other player will surely retaliate with whatever force he has left. The closer the ratio of costs of going second to going first is to one, the more stable the system is because the decision maker is indifferent to striking first or striking second and may be deterred. Low values of strike stability indicate a large disadvantage to attacking second and therefore lead to instability. Deterrence requires both sides to choose non-action (Wait in our model) at each decision epoch.
Strike stability for cyber conflict
The analysis of section 4 shows that if a player has the ability to attack, he eventually does with certainty. This means that cyber conflict with perfect information and a single exploit is deterrence unstable. Intuitively this is because there is no second strike. Theorem 1 is sufficient to demonstrate that the single-attack case is deterrence unstable; the first player to attack receives the reward of his development to date, and the non-attacking player is left with and empty arsenal.
Considerations outside the model we consider may provide some degree of deterrence in reality. For example, military, economic or diplomatic consequences or large cyber munition arsenals may provide some guarantee of a second strike. Such guarantees, while important to deterrence are outside the bounds of our current work. Nevertheless, without these external guarantees deterrence in cyber conflict does not exist.
Conclusion and future work
We have developed and exercised a limited, stylized model. Real situations, of course, have many differences from the idealized mathematics; the utility of this work is to define the cyber conflict problem with perfect information. Additionally, we:
 Demonstrate a framework for analyzing the problem;  Demonstrate that in cyber conflict, idle wait times are damaging, and provide a means to calculate their disutility; and  Show implications for deterrence in cyber conflict. This paper considered a single attack in discrete time with perfect information-three idealizations that help us begin to tackle the problem of cyber conflict. Of these three, the perfect information assumption appears to be the richest area to explore in the future, and with this exploration come considerations of credibility, reputations, and risk taking.
